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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
     The issue before us is whether, in the face of a statutory 
insurer liquidation proceeding in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court, the district court properly stayed this action under the 
Burford abstention doctrine.  We conclude that abstaining and 
retaining jurisdiction was proper, and hence we will affirm. 
                                I. 
     The allegations of this case form a tangled web of intrigue, 
fraud and self-dealing.  It suffices to say that Feige and 
Sechrest purchased Corporate Life Insurance Company and allegedly 
converted $11 million of its mortgage loan portfolio.  Corporate 
Life sued them.  Sechrest settled his case and was released from 
liability.  Sechrest and Corporate Life then joined forces and 
sued Feige, seeking, inter alia, to have certain Feige-Sechrest 
entities dissolved. 
     Feige then filed this suit, alleging that Corporate Life 
fraudulently misrepresented its assets to the Pennsylvania 
Insurance Department and falsely accused Feige and the Feige- 
Sechrest entities of converting Corporate Life's mortgage 
portfolio.  Shortly after the complaint was filed, however, the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court directed the liquidation of 
Corporate Life and stayed all actions against it.  Cynthia 
Maleski, the Statutory Liquidator for Corporate Life, moved to 
stay this action under the Burford abstention doctrine.  The 
district court granted her motion, Feige v. Sechrest, 896 F. 
Supp. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1995), and this appeal followed.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1291, even though the 
district court departed from the traditional application of 
Burford abstention by staying the action rather than dismissing 
the complaint.  See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury 
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 8-10 & nn. 8, 11, 103 S. Ct. 927, 
933-34 & nn.8, 11 (1983); Richman Brothers Records, Inc. v. U.S. 
Sprint Communications Co., 953 F.2d 1431, 1442 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1230, 112 S. Ct. 3056 (1992); Hovsons, 
Inc. v. Secretary of the Interior, 711 F.2d 1208, 1211 (3d Cir. 
1983); Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives v. Farmers Cheese 
Cooperative, 583 F.2d 104, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1978). 
                               II. 
     We recently addressed the standard governing Burfordabstention: 
          Where timely and adequate state-court review 
          is available, a federal court sitting in 
          equity must decline to interfere with the 
          proceedings or orders of state administrative 
          agencies: (1) when there are "difficult 
          questions of state law bearing on policy 
          problems of substantial public import whose 
          importance transcends the result in the case 
          then at bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of 
          federal review of the question in a case and 
          in similar cases would be disruptive of state 
          efforts to establish a coherent policy with 
          respect to a matter of substantial public 
          concern." 
 
Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting New 
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans ("NOPSI"), 109 
S. Ct. 2506, 2514-15 (1989)).  At this point in our 
jurisprudence, there can be little doubt that parallel federal 
and state proceedings would disrupt Pennsylvania's legislative 
framework for the liquidation of insolvent insurers.  See, e.g.,  
General Glass v. Monsour Medical Found., 973 F.2d 197, 201 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home 
Assur. Co., 864 F.2d 1033, 1045 (3d Cir. 1988).  We therefore 
proceed to address the two substantial issues raised on this 
appeal: first, whether adequate state court review is available; 
and second, whether Burford abstention may be applied when, as 
here, the complaint contains claims for money damages. 
                                A. 
     Appellants argue that adequate state court review is not 
available because the Commonwealth Court has no jurisdiction over 
the claims they assert in this action.  The district court 
disagreed, opining: 
          Plaintiffs' claims against non-Corporate Life 
     defendants, to the extent they do not arise under the 
     Insurance Act, are not within the original jurisdiction 
     of the Commonwealth Court.  Nevertheless, those 
     involving the French Company and the Hearthstone bonds 
     materially affect Corporate Life and are therefore a 
     part of the Commonwealth Court action.  All of the 
     claims against the principals of Corporate Life are 
     derivative.  The remaining ones are against Sechrest 
     for conversion of plaintiffs' assets and illegal 
     litigation tactics by reason of his allegedly joining 
     forces with Corporate Life.  These claims should be 
     decided as part of the original dispute between 
     Corporate Life and Feige-Sechrest or deferred until 
     that dispute is resolved. 
 
Feige, 896 F. Supp. at 405. 
     By statute, the Commonwealth Court has jurisdiction over all 
claims arising under the Insurance Act of 1921.  42 Pa. C.S.  
761.  Because any claims against Corporate Life (since replaced 
by the Statutory Liquidator) arise under the Act, all or parts of 
counts III-VIII and X-XIII are subject to timely and adequate 
state court review.  Indeed, there is currently an ongoing 
proceeding in that court regarding the liquidation of Corporate 
Life. 
     Many of appellants' remaining counts (or portions of counts) 
are derivative actions against the directors of Corporate Life.  
Because derivative claims are asserted on behalf of the 
corporation, and that corporation is undergoing statutory 
liquidation, they are bound up intimately with the liquidation 
proceeding and likewise arise under the Act. 
     That leaves the claims against Sechrest and The French Co., 
Inc. for breach of fiduciary duty (counts I & II), rescission 
(count V), civil conspiracy (count VII), abuse of process (count 
VIII), conversion (count IX), tortious interference (count XI) 
and indemnity (count XIII).  Although these claims are certainly 
related to the statutory liquidation of Corporate Life, 
appellants argue that they are no more than garden-variety torts 
which do not arise under the Insurance Act and are not 
inextricably bound up with the liquidation.  Under appellants' 
theory, these claims belong not in the Commonwealth Court, but in 
the Court of Common Pleas, a court where there is currently no 
pending proceeding.  Thus, they argue, the liquidation 
proceedings will not provide an adequate forum in which to 
resolve their claims.  This argument, however, is belied by the 
fact that appellants have asserted a cross-claim against appellee 
Sechrest in the Commonwealth Court action, Maleski v. DP Realty 
Trust, raising most of the same counts listed above. 
     It is clear that the Commonwealth Court has jurisdiction 
over counterclaims.  See Commonwealth v. Frank Briscoe Co., 466 
A.2d 1336, 1340 (Pa. 1983).  Based on that case, appellees assert 
that there is jurisdiction over cross-claims as well.  A case 
they omit from their brief, however, appears on first inspection 
to require a contrary result.  In Commonwealth v. Joseph Bucheit 
& Sons, 483 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1984), the Commonwealth brought an 
action against a contractor in Commonwealth Court.  Defendant 
counterclaimed against the state and sought to join a steel 
supplier as an additional defendant.  Another defendant then 
filed a cross-claim against the first defendant.  The supreme 
court held that, while the counterclaim was within the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court, the other claims were 
not, limiting the reasoning of Frank Briscoe to the context of 
counterclaims.  Accordingly, if Joseph Bucheit is controlling 
authority, the Commonwealth Court has no jurisdiction over 
appellants' cross-claims. 
     We do not believe that Joseph Bucheit stands for the broad 
proposition that the Commonwealth Court has no jurisdiction over 
cross-claims.  That case was decided under 42 Pa. C.S.  
761(a)(2) (jurisdiction of actions brought by the Commonwealth), 
not  761(a)(3) (actions arising under the Insurance Act).  In 
fact, the Joseph Bucheit court stated specifically that the 
involvement of the Commonwealth as a party was key to its 
decision: 
     The spectre of the Commonwealth awaiting final judgment 
     in a case where its own right to recovery has been 
     established, while numerous general contractor and 
     subcontractor defendants and additional defendants seek 
     to shift ultimate responsibility among themselves, is 
     sufficient to counsel the conclusion that the holding 
     in Briscoe must not be extended beyond its facts. 
 
483 A.2d at 851. 
 
     Jurisdiction in this action, however, is based on the 
Liquidator's case arising under the Insurance Act, as the 
Commonwealth Court has already held.  See Maleski v. DP Realty 
Trust, 653 A.2d 54, 65 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).  As that court 
stated: 
          Section 221.26 of the Insurance Act provides that 
     the "liquidator may [. . .] institute an action or 
     proceeding on behalf of the estate of the insurer upon 
     any cause of action" for which the statute of 
     limitations have [sic] not expired.  Additionally, 
     Section 221.28 of the Insurance Act permits the 
     liquidator to avoid fraudulent transfers made by the 
     insurer [. . .], and Section 221.23 of the Insurance 
     Act authorizes the liquidator to "collect all debts and 
     money due and claims belonging to the insurer.  Because 
     this Court is expressly vested with "the original 
     jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings 
     arising under Article V of the Insurance Act, and since 
     the Complaint, filed by the Statutory Liquidator of 
     Corporate Life, alleges causes of action on behalf of 
     Corporate Life and also seeks to recover fraudulently 
     obtained assets, it arises under Article V of the 
     Insurance Act.  Accordingly, this Court has original 
     jurisdiction over the claims. 
 
Id.   
     Here, of course, it is not the Statutory Liquidator who is 
bringing the action, but Feige.  Nevertheless, a major part of 
what Feige is seeking through this litigation is to rescind the 
asset transfer made by Sechrest to the estate of Corporate Life.  
If Feige prevails, the effect of the judgment will be to remove 
those assets from the estate and affect directly and adversely 
what the Liquidator is attempting to achieve through her 
proceedings: the protection of the policyholders.  Thus, even 
though this case appears on the surface to involve "garden- 
variety" torts committed by private parties, we conclude that it, 
too, arises under the Insurance Act.  Accordingly, the 
Commonwealth Court has jurisdiction over the claims, which leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that there is adequate state court 
review for purposes of Burford abstention. 
                                B. 
     Before we conclude that Burford abstention was applied 
correctly, however, we must also confront the fact that the vast 
majority of the claims asserted by appellants are legal in nature 
and seek only money damages.  Of thirteen counts pleaded in their 
complaint, only counts V (rescission), VI (declaratory judgment), 
and counts IX and X (seeking injunctive relief for defendants' 
alleged conversion) are not solely legal in nature.  The district 
court believed that "[t]he essence of the action is that the 
combination formed by Corporate Life and Sechrest against Feige 
should be set aside and penalized.  These are matters that 
obviously sound in equity."  Feige, 896 F. Supp. at 406.  We will 
affirm, but on a different ground. 
                                1. 
     Whether Burford abstention may be applied in cases where 
other than equitable relief is sought has been the source of some 
confusion in our caselaw.  In Baltimore Bank, we held that 
Burford was not available in an action at law.  583 F.2d 111-12.  
A decade later, in Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American 
Home Assur. Co., 864 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1988), we permitted 
Burford abstention in a case where declaratory relief was sought, 
opining in dictum that "a refusal to abstain simply because the 
federal court is not sitting in equity makes no sense."  Id. at 
1044.  Then, a few years later, we reaffirmed the holding of 
Baltimore Bank in University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & 
Co., 923 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1991), denying abstention in a case 
where legal relief was sought.  Id. at 271-72. 
     A year later, however, another panel of this court reached 
the opposite result in another insurance abstention case.  In 
General Glass Indus. Corp. v. Monsour Med. Foundation, 973 F.2d 
197 (3d Cir. 1992), the panel read the Lac D'Amiante dictum 
together with Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 110 S. Ct. 792 
(1990), in which the Supreme Court appeared to uphold sub 
silentio the application of Burford to an action at law.  
Concluding that the decisional authority was inconclusive, it 
interpreted University of Maryland as only "intimating" that 
Burford abstention was not available in legal actions and 
partially affirmed the district court's application of 
abstention.  Id. at 202. 
     More recently, in Riley v. Simmons, we held that Burfordabstention 
was improper, but the panel was divided as to the 
rationale for the decision.  The opinion writer, speaking only 
for himself, believed that abstention was not available because 
there was no adequate opportunity for state court review of 
plaintiffs' securities claims, which were subject to exclusive 
federal jurisdiction.  See 45 F.3d at 777.  The concurrence, on 
the other hand, expressed the view that Burford cannot be applied 
to actions at law, rejecting General Glass and relying on 
Baltimore Bank and University of Maryland.  Id. at 777-79 
(Nygaard, J., concurring).  A district judge, sitting by 
designation, concurred in the result without explanation.  Id. at 
766 n.2 
                                2. 
     After this case was briefed and argued before us, the 
Supreme Court handed down an opinion that settles the issue.  In 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996), the 
California Insurance Commissioner sued Allstate in state court 
seeking damages in contract and in tort for Allstate's alleged 
breach of its reinsurance agreements.  Allstate removed the case 
to federal district court and sought an order compelling 
arbitration.  The Commissioner then moved for a remand to state 
court under Burford.  The district court granted the motion and 
dismissed the complaint.  See id. at 1717.  On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, holding that Burford abstention cannot be 
granted in any form when the relief sought is solely legal in 
nature.  Garamendi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 350, 354-56 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
     The Supreme Court affirmed.  It noted that "the power to 
dismiss under the Burford doctrine, as with other abstention 
doctrines, . . . derives from the discretion historically enjoyed 
by courts of equity."  116 S. Ct. at 1726.  Because such remedies 
have historically been committed to the chancellor's discretion, 
     in cases where the relief being sought is equitable in 
     nature or otherwise discretionary, federal courts not 
     only have the power to stay the action based on 
     abstention principles, but can also, in otherwise 
     appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise 
     jurisdiction altogether by either dismissing the suit 
     or remanding it to state court.  By contrast, while we 
     have held that federal courts may stay actions for 
     damages based on abstention principles, we have not 
     held that those principles support the outright 
     dismissal or remand of damages actions. 
Id. at 1723.  The granting of legal remedies provided by 
applicable law and proven as a factual matter has not 
traditionally been subject to the court's discretion.  
Accordingly, given the "virtually unflagging obligation to 
exercise the jurisdiction given them" by Congress, see Colorado 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
821, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1248 (1976), a district court may not abstain 
under Burford and dismiss the complaint when the remedy sought is 
legal rather than discretionary.  Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. at 
1727.  To the extent, then, that General Glass held that Burfordabstention 
may be applied to dismiss a complaint in an action at 
law, it has been overruled by Quackenbush. 
     In the present case, however, while the district court 
abstained under Burford, it stayed the action rather than dismiss 
the complaint.  In Quackenbush, the Supreme Court indicated in 
dictum that such a course is proper: 
     Unlike the outright dismissal or remand of a federal 
     suit, . . . an order merely staying the action "does 
     not constitute abnegation of judicial duty.  On the 
     contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it.  
     There is only postponement of decision for its best 
     fruition." 
Id. at 1723 (quoting Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 
360 U.S. 25, 29, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 1073 (1959)).  Thus, the Court 
continued: 
     In those cases in which we have applied traditional 
     abstention principles to damages actions, we have only 
     permitted a federal court to withhold action until the 
     state proceedings have concluded; that is, we have 
     permitted federal courts applying abstention principles 
     in damages actions to enter a stay, but we have not 
     permitted them to dismiss the action altogether[.]  
 
           The per se rule described by the Ninth Circuit 
     is, however, more rigid than our precedents require.  
     We have not strictly limited abstention to equitable 
     cases, but rather have extended the doctrine to all 
     cases in which a federal court is asked to provide some 
     form of discretionary relief.  Moreover, as 
     demonstrated by our decision in Thibodaux, we have not 
     held that abstention principles are completely 
     inapplicable in damages actions.  Burford might support 
     a federal court's decision to postpone adjudication of 
     a damages action pending the resolution by the state 
     courts of a disputed question of state law. 
Id. at 1727-28 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
     We think the district court's stay order was entirely 
appropriate.  Rather than abdicate its judicial duty to exercise 
its jurisdiction, the district court simply postponed the 
exercise of that jurisdiction until the proceedings in the 
Commonwealth Court reach their conclusion.  This approach retains 
the sensitivity for concerns of federalism and comity implicated 
by Burford abstention, while preserving appellants' right to 
litigate their claims in the federal forum should the 
Pennsylvania courts, for jurisdictional or other reasons, fail to 
adjudicate them.  The entry of a stay rather than a dismissal 
prevents those claims from becoming time-barred should 
jurisdiction be somehow lacking in the Commonwealth Court, and 
the preclusion doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
will prevent their re-litigation in the more likely event that 
court proceeds to judgment. 
                               III. 
     We will accordingly affirm the order of the district court. 
                              
